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Informed Consent to Medical Treatment
Milton Oppenheim*
M EDICAL MALPRACTICE is usually considered in terms of negli-
gent conduct by the physician in the course of the physi-
cian-patient relation. Many of the actions are not predicated on
the law of negligence, although this type of malpractice un-
doubtedly is the most common type of litigation. A substantial
group of cases deal with unauthorized operations, which are
characterized as battery, emerging from lack of informed con-
sent.
If the physician acts without consent, he is guilty of battery,
and is liable for such compensatory damages as the patient can
prove. If the doctor knows that he has no consent he may also
be liable for punitive damages and court costs.
Compensatory damages represent the amount of the pecu-
niary injury actually suffered. However, in some cases an in-
jured party may be able to recover punitive damages in addition
to the compensatory award. Punitive damages are designed to
punish and deter intentional wrongdoing. To be distinguished
from exemplary damages are nominal damages. Nominal dam-
ages are given where a plaintiff's legal rights have been violated
but he is unable to show any actual harm. In Lacy v. Laird' the
court allowed the plaintiff to recover only a nominal sum of $1.00.
In addition the plaintiff probably would be entitled to claim his
court costs simply because his rights had been violated and the
wrongdoer should be made to bear the costs of suit.
To comprehend the importance of informed consent it is
necessary to understand that the duties of a physician to the
patient are derived from two legal concepts: (a) contract,2 and
(b) fiduciary relation.3
* A.B., Univ. of Mich.; B.M., M.D., Wayne State Univ.; Diplomate of
American Board of Anesthesiology, Fellow in American College of Anes-
thesiology, Fellow of Int. College of Surgeons; Director of Anesthesiology
at Woman's Hospital in Cleveland, Ohio; Third-year student at Cleveland-
Marshall Law School.
1 166 Ohio St. 12, 139 NE 2d 25 (1956).
2 Cartwright v. Bartholomew, 83 Ga. App. 503, 64 S.E. 2d. 323 (1951);
Robins v. Finestone, 308 N. Y. 543, 127 N.E. 2d. 330 (1955); Helms v. DAy,
215 S.W. 2d 356 (Tex. 1948).
3 Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P. 2d. 1093 (1960); Mitchel v.
Robinson, 334 S.W. 2d 11 (Mo. 1961).
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Extension of Consent
Discretion of the physician and complete confidence in his
decisions are necessary adjuncts to good medicine, and an inte-
gral part of the fiduciary relation of physician and patient. This
view was presented in Bennan v. Parsonent,4 where the defend-
ant surgeon, while operating for a left hernia, discovered a more
dangerous condition on the right side. The court found an
extension of consent to conform to the fiduciary relation and said:
The surgical employment of anesthesia has as a matter of
common knowledge, not only eliminated the possibility of
obtaining the patient's consent during the operation, but
has also had other radical effects of which notice must be
taken. The conclusion therefore, to which we are led is
that when a person has selected a surgeon to operate upon
him, and has appointed no other person to represent him
during the period of unconsciousness that constitutes a part
of such operation, the law will by implication constitute
such surgeon the representative pro hoc vice of his patient,
and will, within the scope to which such implication supplies,
cast upon him the responsibility of so acting in the interest
of his patient that the latter shall receive the full benefit
of the professional judgment and skill to which he is legally
entitled.
Although the fiduciary relation of physician and patient has
been cited and upheld, failure to fully disclose pertinent facts
to the patient has brought judgment against the physician. In
Dietz v. King5 it was held that a physician owes a duty to his
patient to make reasonable disclosure of all significant facts
under the circumstances of the situation, but such duty is limited
to those disclosures which a reasonable medical practitioner
would make under the same or similar circumstances.
An increased burden has been placed upon the medical
practitioner in the basic necessity of obtaining consent and more
particularly, informed consent, to therapy and surgery. Physi-
cians approve the legal requirement of an informed consent, its
desirability and propriety. However, insufficient consideration
has been given to certain aspects of the problem. In the present
state of rapid development of medical science, errors of diagnosis
and therapy, in total or in part, are inevitable in a considerable
percentage of cases.
4 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 Atl. 948 (1912).
5 184 F. Supp. 944 (D. C. E. D. Va. 1960).
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It is submitted that the public interest requires that the
physician be permitted to exercise his discretion in good faith,
knowing that the physician-patient relation is one of fiduciary
requirements of trust and confidence. This is important, for if
one is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon surgical
or therapeutic procedures, no matter how remote, it may well
result in unduly alarming the patient, who is already appre-
hensive, fearful, and dejected.
As a result such patient may refuse to undergo treatment
in which there is, in fact, a minimal risk. It may also result in
actually increasing apprehension. A patient's mental and
emotional problem is very important and may be crucial. In
considering the informed consent to be employed, a certain
amount of discretion must be permitted to the physician.
The physician recognizes the "inviolability of the person"
of the patient but seeks to modify this in terms of good medical
practice. Inviolability of the person is discussed in Sibbach v.
Wilson." Mr. Justice Frankfurter (dissenting) referred to Union
Pacific R. R. Co. v. Botsford7 as a settled doctrine that denied
the power of the federal courts in a civil action to compel a
plaintiff suing for injury to the person to submit to a physical
examination.
It rests on considerations akin to what is familiarly known
in the English law as the liberties of the subject. To be sure,
the immunity that was recognized in the Botsford case has
no constitutional sanction. It is amenable to statutory change.
But the "inviolability of a person" was deemed to have such
historic roots in Anglo-American law that it was not to be
curtailed "unless by clear unquestionable authority of law."
In this connection it is significant that a judge as responsive
to procedural needs as was Mr. Justice Holmes, should on
behalf of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, have
supported the Botsford doctine on the ground that "the
common law was very slow to sanction any violation of or
interference with person of a free citizen."
As far as national law is concerned, a drastic change in
public policy in a matter deeply touching the sensibilities of
people or even their prejudices as to privacy, ought not to be
inferred from a general authorization to formulate rules for the
more uniform and effective dispatch of business on the civil side
6 312 U. S. 1,655, 61 S. Ct. 422 (1941).
7 141 U. S. 250, 11 S. Ct. 1000 (1891).
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of the federal courts. Powell," in a recent article, stated:
Under a free government at least, the free citizen's first
and greatest right, which underlies all others is the right to
the inviolability of his person, in other words, his right to
himself is the subject of universal acquiescence, and this
right necessarily forbids a physician or surgeon, however
skillful or eminent, who has been asked to examine, diag-
nose, advise and prescribe... , to violate without permission
the bodily integrity of his patient by a major or capital
operation, placing him under anesthetic for the purpose,
and operating on him without his consent or knowledge.
The privacy of the individual was protected by Judge
Cardozo in Schloendorfl v. Society of New York Hospital.9 The
plaintiff entered the hospital for the purpose of being examined
while under ether anesthesia. She testified that she notified the
physician that there must be no operation. While under anes-
thesia a tumor was removed from her abdomen. A directed
verdict for the defendant was sustained by the Court of Appeals
because no master-servant relation existed. It was also necessary
for the court to determine the nature of the wrong committed.
Another defense was that the patient had waived any damages
for negligence by entering a charitable institution. The defense
was not found to be good, the operation being trespass. Judge
Cardozo, in this historical decision, stated:
Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a
right to determine what shall be done with his own body;
and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in
damages.
This is true except in cases of emergency when the patient is
unconscious, and where it is necessary to operate before consent
can be obtained.
In this case the express prohibition made it impossible to
imply a consent by the discovery of a condition discovered by
examination, even though good medical practice might have
called for an immediate operation.
8 Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 Md. L. R. 189 (1961).
9 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N.E. 92 (1914).
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Consent-Generally Considered
There are three forms of consent: express, 10 implied in
fact," and implied in law. 2 To these forms has been added,
recently, the necessity of an informed consent.' 3
Case law deals voluminously with the problem of consent.
In Mohr v. Williams14 the plaintiff consulted the defendant, a
physician and surgeon of standing and character, with reference
to a difficulty with her right ear. The doctor examined that ear
and advised an operation, to which the plaintiff consented. After
the patient was placed under an anesthetic and was unconscious
therefrom, the defendant doctor examined her left ear and found
it in a more serious condition than the right one and in greater
need of an operation. The plaintiff, who had not previously
experienced any difficulty with her left ear, was not informed
prior to the time when she was placed under the influence of the
anesthetic that any difficulty existed with reference to it, and she
did not consent to an operation thereon. Subsequently, on the
claim that the operation seriously impaired her sense of hearing,
she brought an action to recover for battery. The trial resulted
in a verdict for the plaintiff. It was held:
a) That the defendant had no authority to perform the
operation without the plaintiff's consent, express or im-
plied.
b) That her consent was not expressly given, and whether
it should be implied from the circumstances of the case
was a question for the jury to determine.
c) That if the operation was not authorized by the express
or implied consent of the plaintiff, it was wrongful, and
constituted battery.
In Rolater v. Strain5 the patient consented to the operation
on her right foot on the express agreement that no bones should
be removed. She was placed under an anesthetic, and the
operation performed. In performing the operation a sesamoid
bone was removed. Contending that she did not consent to the
10 Farner v. Olkon, 40 Cal. 2d 503, 254 P. 2d 520 (1953).
11 McGuire v. Rix, 118 Neb. 434, 225 N.W. 120 (1929).
12 Luka v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912).
13 Mitchel v. Robinson, 334 S. W. 2d 11 (Mo. 1961); Natanson v. Kline, 186
Kan. 393, 350 P. 2d 1093 (1960); DiFillippo v. Preston, 173 A. 2d 333 (Del.
1961).
14 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12. (1905).
15 39 Okla. 572, 137 P. 96 (1913).
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removal of this sesamoid bone, and that its removal was wrong-
ful and unlawful, and that her foot was permanently injured by
reason of the removal of this bone, she brought the action for
battery. The court held that the patient did not expressly con-
sent to the extension of the surgery and that the removal of the
bone from her foot was wrongful and unlawful and constituted,
in law, a trespass upon her person and a technical battery.
This view is opposite to Bennas v. Parsonent,16 which con-
sidered only the elements of the contract without regard to the
fiduciary relation which for the public policy and good medicine
should have been considered. In this situation the court adopted
the rule that the employment of anesthesia in surgical operations
had extended the power and authority of the surgeon during the
period of unconsciousness so as to cast upon the operator the
responsibility and duty of acting for the best interests of the
patient with respect to the extent of the operation, provided that
the surgeon confined his acts to remedying the conditions about
which he was consulted.
Woods v. Pommerening17 was a malpractice action by the
patient against physicians for alleged negligence in administer-
ing gold injections for the treatment of skin lesions on the face
and neck of the patient. The Supreme Court held that the evi-
dence sustained the finding that the doctors treated the patient
in accordance with the standard of medical practice in the com-
munity, and that they were not guilty of negligence.
The medical testimony disclosed that gold therapy was the
usual and standard treatment in the community for chronic
lupus erythematosus; that the defendant doctors used a proper
and recognized dosage; and that for the purpose of the discussion
of informed consent, it was not the customary standard of
practice to tell the patient all the risks involved; and that the
judgment of the individual doctor had to be exercised in the light
of the mental and psychosomatic makeup of the patient in ad-
vising of the risk involved.
The problem of standard of practice followed in the com-
munity is important in arriving at a cause of action in negligence.
This has been affirmed in recent decisions.' 8
16 83 N. J. L. 20, 83 A. 948 (1912).
'7 44 Wash. 2d 867, 271 P. 2d 705 (1954).
18 Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wash. 2d 378, 293 P. 2d 766 (1956); Skodje v.
Hardy, 47 Wash. 2d 557, 288 P. 2d 471 (1956).
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The changing trend in the consent a patient gives to the
physician was noted in Hunter v. Burroughs.19 This case was an
action for malpractice in the treatment of eczema with x-rays
and salves, which treatment had resulted in extensive burns of
both lower extremities.
In one of the many allegations of negligence, the plaintiff
maintained that the defendant, as a specialist in skin diseases
and x-ray, should have realized that there was a great danger
in the use of x-ray treatment, and that unforeseen injuries may
be sustained; that in the exercise of ordinary care, it became the
duty of the defendant to make known to the plaintiff the dangers;
and that if the patient had known that such injuries might result
therefrom, he would not have permitted the treatment.
In Salgo v. Leland Stanford,20 the court said:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician
may not minimize the known dangers of a procedure or
operation in order to induce his patient's consent. At the
same time, the physician must place the welfare of his
patient above all else and this very fact places him in a
position in which he sometimes must choose between two
alternative courses of action. One is to explain to the patient
every risk attendant upon any surgical procedure of opera-
tion, no matter how remote. This may well result in alarm-
ing a patient who is already unduly apprehensive and who
may as a result refuse to undertake surgery in which there
is in fact minimal risk; it may also result in actually increas-
ing the risks by reason of the physiological result of the
apprehension itself. The other is to recognize that each
patient presents a separate problem, that the patient's mental
and emotional condition is important and in certain cases
may be crucial, and that in discussing the element of risk
a certain amount of discretion must be employed, consistent
with the full disclosure of facts necessary to an informed
consent.
19 123 Va. 113, 96 SE 360 (1918).
20 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 317 P. 2d 170 (1957).
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Informed Consent
In Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hospital,21 the courts were
definitely speaking of the requirement of informed consent. This
was an action for damages for alleged battery arising from an
unauthorized extension of the operation on the plaintiff, who had
consented to a transurethral prostatic resection. In performing
the operation the defendant surgeon severed the plaintiff's
spermatic cords. The plaintiff alleged that nothing had been said
concerning the fact that he would be rendered sterile by the
operation. The Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded with the
principle that this case recognized that a patient is entitled to
know the probable facts and results regarding the contemplated
surgery. Under the circumstances, had the patient been aware
of all the facts, he might have chosen to reject the surgery.
Where no immediate emergency existed, the patient should have
been informed, before the prostatic-gland operation, that if his
spermatic cord was severed it would result in his sterilization.
On the other hand, he should have been advised if this was not
done there would be a possibility of an infection which could
result in serious consequences. The patient would have had at
least the opoprtunity of deciding whether or not he wanted to
take the chance of a possible infection if the operation was per-
formed in one manner, or of becoming sterile if it was performed
in another manner. Where a surgeon can ascertain alternative
situations in advance of an operation, and no immediate emer-
gency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternate pos-
sibilities and be given a chance to decide before the doctor pro-
ceeds with the operation.
In Mitchel v. Robinson22 it was known that a high incidence
of intended convulsions, and of resultant fractures, in insulin
treatment for emotional illness was a common occurrence, and it
was held that the doctors owed to a patient, who was in posses-
sion of his faculties, the duty to inform him generally of the
possible hazards and complications of insulin treatment. The
patient was awarded judgment against the defendant physician,
in a malpractice action, for convulsive fractures sustained while
undergoing his insulin therapy for treatment of emotional illness.
From an adverse judgment of the Circuit Court, the physician
21 251 Minn. 427, 88 N. W. 2d 186 (1958).
22 334 S.W. 2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
May, 1962
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appealed to the Supreme Court of Missouri, which reversed the
decision.
Mitchel had received several courses of electro-shock treat-
ment with associated insulin injections. In his seventh insulin
treatment he had a severe generalized convulsion which resulted
in compression fractures of the fifth, sixth, and seventh dorsal
vertebrae. It was to recover damages for these specific injuries
that Mitchel instituted the action.
There was no expert testimony to show that the insulin
therapy failed to conform to the required standards of an ordi-
narily careful and prudent neurologist in the community. The
plaintiff made no claim of negligence in any of the general aspects
of medical care. There was no question as to the plaintiff's con-
sent to the therapy. The main question of this case was whether,
under the circumstances of the illness and the treatment in-
volved, the doctors were under a duty to inform the plaintiff
that one of the hazards of insulin treatment was possible fracture
of bones not involved in either the illness or treatment, where
the hazard actually existed. The plaintiff's principal claim of
negligence was based on the failure to disclose to him the hazards
of insulin treatment, and, of course, evidence that the plaintiff
would not have consented to the treatment had he known of
the dangers.
In the court's opinion, under the particular circumstances
and nature of Mitchel's illness, this radical and new procedure,
with its rather high incidence of serious and permanent injuries
not connected with the illness, the doctors owed to their patient
the duty to inform him generally of the possible serious collateral
hazards. There was the issue of whether or not the doctors were
negligent in failing to inform him of the dangers of shock therapy.
Kansas has solved this problem, at least in regard to public
institutions, by passing a statute23 which provides that "no per-
son" suffering physical or mental injuries may sue for damages
against any physician or technician "unless the injury or death
resulted from gross negligence."
Natanson v. Kline24 was an action for malpractice against
a hospital and the physician in charge of its radiology depart-
ment, to recover for injuries sustained as the result of radiation
23 G. S. Kan. 1959 Supp. 76-1239.
24 187 Kan. 186, 354 P. 2d 670 (1960).
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therapy with radioactive cobalt, alleged to have been given in
an excessive amount.
The plaintiff, Irma Natanson, suffering from a cancer of the
breast, had a radical left mastectomy performed on May 29, 1955.
At the direction of Dr. Crumpacker, the surgeon who performed
the operation, the plaintiff engaged Dr. John R. Kline, a radiolo-
gist, for radiation therapy to the site of the mastectomy and the
surrounding areas.
Dr. Kline, a licensed physician and specialist in radiation
therapy, was head of the radiology department at St. Francis
Hospital at Wichita, Kansas. The plaintiff sought damages for
injuries claimed to have been sustained as a result of alleged acts
of negligence in the administration of the cobalt radiation treat-
ment. Dr. Kline and the hospital were named as the defendants.
On appeal the plaintiff requested the trial court to give the
following instructions:
You are instructed that the relationship between physician
and patient is a fiduciary one. The relationship requires the
physician to make a full disclosure to the patient of all
matters within his knowledge affecting the interests of the
patient. Included within the matters which the physician
must advise the patient are the nature of the proposed treat-
ment and any hazards of the proposed treatment which are
known to the physician. Every adult person has the right
to determine for himself or herself whether or not he will
subject his body to hazards of any particular medical treat-
ment.
You are instructed that if you find from the evidence
that defendant Kline knew that the treatment he proposed
to administer to plaintiff involved hazard or danger he was
under a duty to advise the plaintiff of that fact and if you
further find that defendant Kline did not advise plaintiff of
such hazards then defendant Kline was guilty of negli-
gence. 2
5
The plaintiff argued that here was a case where the patient
consented to the treatment, but afterwards alleged that the
nature and consequences of the risks of the treatment were not
properly explained to her. She pointed out this was not an
action for battery, where a patient had given no consent to the
treatment.
What appears to distinguish the case of unauthorized sur-
gery or treatment from the traditional battery case is the fact
25 Ibid.
May, 1962
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that in almost all of the former instances the physician is acting
in relatively good faith for the benefit of the patient. While it
is true that in some cases the results are not, in fact, beneficial
to a patient, the courts have repeatedly stated that doctors are
not insurers. Traditional non-medical battery involves a defend-
ant who is acting mainly out of malice or in a manner generally
considered as "antisocial." One who commits the usual assault
and battery certainly is not seeking to confer any benefit upon
the one assaulted.
The fundamental distinction between ordinary assault and
battery and medical negligence such as would constitute mal-
practice, is that the former is intentional and the latter unin-
tentional.
In Natanson v. Kline25 the patient consented to the treat-
ment, but alleged in a malpractice action that the nature and
consequences of the risks of the treatment were not properly
explained to her. This related directly to the question of whether
or not the physician had obtained the informed consent of the
patient to render the treatment administered. The court then
expounded:
A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects
himself to liability if he withholds any facts which are neces-
sary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the patient
to the proposed treatment. Likewise the physician may not
minimize the known dangers of a procedure or operation in
order to induce his patient's consent. At the same time, the
physician must place himself in a position in which he some-
times must choose between two alternative courses of action.
If he is to explain to the patient every risk attendant upon
any surgical procedure or operation, no matter how remote
this may well result in alarming a patient who is already
unduly apprehensive and who may as a result refuse to
undertake surgery in which there is in fact minimal risk;
it may also result in actually increasing the risk by reason
of the physiological results of the apprehension itself. The
other is to recognize that each patient presents a separate
problem, that the patient's mental and emotional condition
is important and in certain cases may be crucial, and that
in discussing the element of risk a certain amount of dis-
cretion must be employed consistent with that necessary to
an informed consent.
Whether or not a physician or surgeon is under a duty to
disclose all risks of a proposed treatment to a patient depends
upon the circumstances of the particular case and the general
25 Ibid.
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practice with respect to such cases followed by the medical
profession in the locality. The custom of the medical profession
to warn must be established by medical testimony.
In DiFillippo v. Preston,26 the patient was referred to the
defending surgeon, Dr. D. J. Preston, by her family physician, for
thyroid surgery. Dr. Preston did not warn Mrs. DiFillippo about
the possibility of damage to the recurrent laryngeal nerves pro-
ducing loss of voice as a possible effect of the operation. Mrs.
DiFillippo consented to have the operation performed. Since the
operation, the patient has been unable to speak above a hoarse
whisper, the cause being injury to the recurrent laryngeal nerves
resulting in paralysis of the vocal cords. As a result of the
paralysis, the patient was forced to submit to a tracheotomy
through which she presumably will be forced to breathe for
many years, and perhaps for the balance of her life.
The theory of action against Dr. Preston was based on two
causes. First, negligence, in performing the procedure as he did,
in preference to another technique, the Lahey method. The Court
exonerated Dr. Preston on this score, because there was no
evidence in the record that Dr. Preston failed to perform the
operation, using the technique selected by him, in accordance
with due care and the standards of competence demanded of
surgeons employing that particular technique.
Secondly, there was negligence based on the admitted fact
that the defendant did not warn her of the possibility that a
thyroidectomy might result in injury to the recurrent laryngeal
nerves and paralysis to the vocal cords. It was argued that Mrs.
DiFillippo never gave an informed consent to the operation, with
the result that Dr. Preston was responsible for the injurious
effects of his battery. It was stated that a surgeon owed to his
patient a disclosure of specific known risks, subject to the
exception of the existence of any emergency. The patient further
alleged that there was no emergency facing her and that Dr.
Preston had the duty to warn her of the possibility of unfavor-
able complications.
In this case all expert medical testimony agreed that it was
not the practice in the community to warn patients of the pos-
sibility of resulting injury to the recurrent laryngeal nerves from
a thyroidectomy. This being the undisputed fact, it followed
that there was no duty imposed on the defendant to warn Mrs.
26 173 A. 2d 333 (Del. 1961).
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DiFillippo of the specific possibility. Medical testimony justified
the inference that a warning under the circumstances of this case
would have been a departure from the usual custom or standard.
Judgment in favor of the defendant physician was affirmed.
The absurdity of the trend towards a "more informed
patient" is evident in the attempts of physicians to comply, even
where compliance is not in conformance with good medical prac-
tice.27 This required "informed" consent may create delay, appre-
hension, and restrictions on the use of new techniques that will
impair the progress of medicine. It is questionable whether the
"average prudent man" will understand and comprehend the
following examples of informed consent forms used by a promi-
nent neuro-surgeon in his practice:
(A) CONSENT AND OPERATIVE PERMIT
PATIENT AGE ------ PLACE -- --
DATE ----------------- TIME ----------- A. M.
P.M.
1. I hereby authorize Dr. ------------- and whomever he may
designate as his assistants to perform upon ----
(State name of person or "myself")
the following operation: "THYROIDECTOMY" that is,
(State procedure(s) to be performed)
"SURGICAL REMOVAL OF THYROID GLAND-SUB-
(State full explanation of procedure)
TOTAL" and if any unforeseen condition arises in the course
of this operation calling in his judgment for procedures in
addition to do different from these now contemplated, I
further request and authorize him to do whatever he deems
advisable and necessary in the circumstances.
2. The clinical outcome in my case is directly in proportion to
the nature of the pathology, that is, the condition revealed,
disclosed, or discovered by the procedure or procedures. The
nature, purpose, and risk of the operation and procedures and
possible alternative methods of treatment, possibility of com-
plications have been fully explained to me. I acknowledge
that no guarantee or assurance has been made as to the re-
sults that may be obtained. Further, I consent to the disposal
of any tissue which may be removed.
3. My condition therefore, may:
(a) Be improved;
(b) Remain stationary; or
(c) Become aggravated with respect to "Weakness or
Hoarseness of Voice: Prominence of Eyes may persist:
Calcium Metabolism may be disturbed, with resulting
muscle weakness."
27 Adelstein, Personal Communication (June 1961).
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4. I consent, authorize and request the administration of such
anesthetic or anesthetics as is deemed suitable by the phy-
sician-anesthetist who shall be chosen by the surgeon. It is
the understanding of the undersigned that the physician-
anesthetist will have full charge of the administration and
maintenance of the anesthesia, and that this is an independent
function from the surgery.
The above has been read and explained to me and I accept
responsibility for these or any other complications which may
arise or result during or following the above procedure, which
is to be performed at my request.
Signature of Patient
Signature of Patient's
husband or wife-----------------------------
When patient is a minor or incompetent to give con-
sent: Signature of Person Authorized to consent
for the patient. - -
WITNESS:--------------------------------------------
RELATIONSHIP TO PATIENT
(B) CONSENT SHEET AND OPERATIVE PERMIT
Los Angeles, California
------------------ 19 -----
1. I understand that the operation proposed in my case is a
Cervical Laminectomy, that is, opening of the spinal cord and
its coverings in the neck, with the removal of such tissues as
are indicated.
2. The clinical outcome in my case is directly in proportion to
the nature of the pathology-condition revealed-that is, disc,
tumor, or growth, or disease of the spinal cord or its blood
vessels.
3. My condition therefore may:
a. Be improved;
b. Remain stationary; or
c. Become aggravated with respect to motor power, dis-
turbances in sensation, or control of sphincters, bladder,
or rectal, or both.
The above has been read and explained to me, and I accept re-
sponsibility for these or any other complications which may arise
or result during or following the surgical procedure, which is
performed at my request.
(Patient's Signature)
WITNESS:
(Head Nurse)
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(C) CONSENT AND OPERATIVE PERMIT
FOR
CASAERIAN GANGLION OPERATION
Los Angeles, California
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1. The side of the face (operation) may be numb.
2. There may be a loss of sensation on the cornea of the eye
on the side operated, with the possibility of ulceration leading
to possible loss of the eye.
3. There may be impaired hearing on the operated side.
4. There may be residual weakness in chewing movements on
the operated side.
5. There may be weakness of the muscle of facial expression on
the operated side.
6. There may be residual pain on the operated side.
7. There may be weakness of the body-hemiplegia-on the
operated side of the body.
The above has been read and explained to me, and I accept re-
sponsibility for these or any other complications which may arise
or result during or following this surgical procedure, which is
performed at my request.
(Patient's Signature)
WITNESS:
(Head Nurse)
(D) CONSENT SHEET AND OPERATIVE PERMIT
Los Angeles, California
------------------ 19 -----
1. I understand that the operation procedure in my case is a
high, right Thoracic Sympathectomy, which means the re-
moval of a rib or ribs, and the sectioning of the thoracic and
interxostal sympathetic nerves.
2. The clinical outcome in my case is directly proportional to
the nature of the condition that I now have, which has been
present since at least ------------ following surgery on my
hand, for a crushing injury with Median Nerve involvement.
3. My condition, therefore, may
a. Be improved;
b. Remain stationary;
c. Become aggravated;
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d. I may have a drooped eyelid and constriction of one
pupil;
e. Post-operative discomfort may be present in my chest
wall.
The above has been read and explained to me, and I accept re-
sponsibility for these or any other complications which may
arise or result during or following this surgical procedure, which
is performed at my request.
(Patient's Signature)
WITNESS:
(Head Nurse)
Conclusion
Problems which have developed from the trend to require
physicians to make a full and frank disclosure to the patient
of the pertinent facts related to his illness resolve themselves
into several issues.
What is the extent of a physician's duty to disclose to his
patient a particular method of treatment? What duty is there
upon him to explain the nature and probable consequences of
that treatment to the patient? To what extent should he disclose
the existence and nature of the risks inherent in the treatment?
The necessity for having a patient's consent which is broad
enough to cover all contingencies, coupled with the difficulty of
foreseeing and providing for all contingencies in specific terms,
makes it advisable for the physician to do two things before he
undertakes to perform serious operations. First, he should ex-
plain to the patient what normally happens in a case such as
his, as well as some of the major complications which may occur
though they are not regarded as probable. This need not be
done in a way to alarm the patient; it should be possible to do it
in such a manner as to impress the patient that his doctor knows
his business and foresees everything. Such a full discussion
will probably eliminate many of the disappointments and mis-
understandings by patients (out of which lawsuits grow). If the
discussion does not lead to an unqualified desire by the patient
that the physician proceed according to medical indications, it
at least will make clear to the physician that he is dealing with
an unreasonable patient and perhaps should not incur the risk
of handling the case. Second, the physician should insist on a
May, 1962
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consent of the patient in writing and in broad general terms. The
consent should be in writing in order to avoid subsequent dis-
putes as to what was agreed upon. It should be general and
inclusive, so as to authorize the physician to proceed despite
probable contingencies.
To be legally valid, the consent given to a procedure must
be intelligent, or informed consent, with an understanding of
what is to be done and the risks involved. This is true except
in cases of emergency, where the patient is unconscious, and
where it is necessary to operate before consent can be obtained.
This suggestion perhaps may be ethical rather than legal, but it
does seem that in good morals a patient ought not, in his efforts
to obtain a money verdict, be permitted to repudiate the sound
judgment exercised in his behalf by the surgeon of his choice, in
whose judgment, had he been capable of being consulted, he un-
questionably would have concurred.
In an attempt to find a way to escape this dilemma legal
scholars have made "legal consent" the subject of many articles.
Kelly2s reviews many malpractice cases dealing with consent
of the patient, but the article fails to deal with the problem of
disclosure, involving on one hand, the right of the patient to
decide for himself, and on the other, a possible therapeutic
ground for withholding information. Lund,29 McGoid,30 Powell,31
and Smith32 also present the legal view. Hirsh :13 presented the
doctors' viewpoint. The American Medical Association has
consolidated the requirements of the various forms to be used by
the doctors according to the advice of its legal department. 34
28 Kelly, The Physician, The Patient and The Consent, 8 Kan. L. R. 405
(1960).
29 Lund, The Doctor, The Patient, and the Truth, 19 Tenn. L. R. 344 (1946).
30 McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability for Unauthorized Medical Treatment,
41 Minn. L. R. 381 (1957); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practi-
tioners, 12 Vanderbilt L. R. 549 (586).
31 Powell, Consent to Operative Procedures, 21 Md. L. R. 189 (1961).
32 Smith, Therapeutic Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient
Sick with Serious or Fatal Illness, 919 Tenn. L. R. 349 (1946).
33 Hirsh, Informed Consent to Treatment, Medical-Legal Comment, 176
J. A. M. A. 436 (May, 1961).
34 Medicolegal Forms With Legal Analysis, Law Department, American
Medical Association (1961).
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